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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
hearing to every permit duration challenge. A more cautious wording
of the requirements of procedural due process for NPDES permit
issuance or an identification of the special circumstance of an abso-
lute hearing denial would have assured the proper limitation of the
scope of the Fourth Circuit holding in Consolidation Coal. Future
litigants, who challenge permit durations and are afforded less than
a full EPA evidentiary hearing for valid reasons, may, therefore, cite
the broad holding of this case as supporting an absolute right to a full
hearing. That litigation should ultimately clarify the Consolidation
Coal decision as providing only a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
JON P. LECKERLING
VI. EVIDENCE
A. Sufficiency of Evidence.
Independent Evidence to Implicate Conspirators
In a conspiracy case, independent evidence showing the defendant
to be part of the conspiracy is necessary before a co-defendant's out-
of-court declarations are admissible under the co-conspirator's excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.' The quantum of independent evidence nec-
I Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1079
(Chadbourn rev. 1972). The Glasser case held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to prove participation in a conspiracy. 315 U.S. at 80.
In Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953), the Court stated that declara-
tions not made in furtherance of the conspiracy cannot be used against a co-
conspirator, and therefore, "declarations of conspirator do not bind the co-conspirator
if made after the conspiracy has ended." Id. at 617-18. In regard to that criterion, the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Blackshire, 538 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 113 (1976) held that since a co-conspirator's arrest terminates the conspiracy,
and since a statement of the apprehended conspirator would be in frustration of, not
furtherance of, the criminal enterprise, Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217
(1946), such statement is not admissible against the co-conspirators. Blackshire was
convicted for distributing and conspiring to distribute heroin under 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), & § 846 (1970). Evidence showed that Blackshire was merely involved with
the fringes of the conspiracy. He did not cut or bag the heroin, and there was no proof
that Blackshire was either a pusher or took part in the sale which led to the indict-
ments. Only circumstantial evidence aligned Blackshire with the conspiracy.
Blackshire, however, had been seen in the Baltimore airport, accompanying the
conspiracy ringleader from California. After the arrest of one of Blackshire's co-
defendants, the co-defendant told police that luggage with a California tag on it had
been borrowed by Blackshire. As the statement was not made in furtherance of the
conspiracy, the Fourth Circuit held it inadmissible, and since Blackshire's link to the
conspiracy was tenuous at best, the admission of the co-defendant's statement was
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essary to align the defendant with the conspiracy has generally been
held to be "prima facie" proof of the conspiracy.' While it has been
held that only "slight" evidence is necessary,3 or a fair preponderance
of evidence,4 or enough substantial independent evidence "to take the
question to the jury,"5 in practical terms these standards are very
similar to "prima facie" proof.' Accordingly, in United States v.
Stroupe,7 the Fourth Circuit applied the standard requiring indepen-
dent proof of involvement in a conspiracy by a fair preponderance of
evidence, and found that the government's proof did not meet that
standard.
8
In Stroupe, government agents went to one Wright's home to pro-
cure drugs. Wright called someone named Wayne, Stroupe's first
name, about the purchase, and then told the agents that they would
have to pay first. A subsequent telephone call to Wayne in the agents'
presence disclosed the location where the transaction was to be made.
Wright and the agents then went to Stroupe's trailer, and Wright
took the agents' money and went into the trailer alone. Shortly,
Wright, Stroupe, and a girl emerged and Wright got in the car and
handed a bag containing amphetamine to the agents. Wright pointed
to Stroupe and indicated to the agents that he had purchased the
drugs from Stroupe. Two weeks later, Wright accompanied the agents
in a purchase of amphetamine from David and Mark Warren. An
agent asked Wright whether this amphetamine was as good as that
purchased earlier. Wright replied, "You mean the stuff we got from
Wayne Stroupe?"9 This was the essence of the government's evi-
dence.
held not to be harmless error. 538 F.2d at 571. Blackshire's trial was before the effective
date of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the law relied on in Blackshire is now
codified. FED. R. EviD. 801(d) provides in pertinent part that "(d) [a] statement is
not hearsay if . . . (2) [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy."
2 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States
v. Lucido, 486 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320 (4th
Cir. 1973). For a further collection of cases, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1160-67 (1972).
3 United States v. Lee, 483 F.2d 968, 969 (5th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1028 (1970).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1973).
* When the Supreme Court spoke of a standard of enough substantial independent
evidence "to take the question to the jury," id., it cited as supportive cases which used
the "prima facie" proof standard. United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1972).
7 538 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1066.
' Id. at 1065.
1977] FOURTH dIRCUIT REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit found this evidence insufficient to show
Stroupe's involvement in the conspiracy by a fair preponderance of
independent evidence. The court based its decision on the following:
the agents could not have known positively that Wright procured the
amphetamine from Stroupe, they did not overhear any definite con-
versation between Stroupe and Wright, no knowledge of the actual
number of people in the trailer was attributable to the agents, they
could not trace any purchase money to Stroupe, and finally, they
observed no transfer of money to Stroupe. 1
Courts have stated that participation in a conspiracy cannot be
proved by mere association. 1 Witnessing the defendant in the vicin-
ity of the narcotics exchange is not sufficient, 12 nor is seeing the
defendant and seller converse without knowing what was said, 3 nor
is merely seeing a bag pass from defendant to seller. 4 On similar
facts, the Ninth Circuit has held that there was no evidence of partic-
ipation in a conspiracy when the defendant was not "shown to have
touched, possessed, sold, or conspired to sell narcotics." '" Likewise,
cases in which the evidence has proved a prima facie conspiracy have
always contained at least one act on defendant's part involving him
" Id. at 1065-66.
" United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
2167 (1976); United States v. Mendez, 496 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
12 Glover v. United States, 306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1962).
3 Id. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (police, acting on unspecified informa-
tion from an informer, and knowledge of defendant's picture and a prior conviction,
arrested defendant; held that since there was no specificity concerning the informant's
communications, and no reasons were given as to why such information was credible,
no probable cause for arrest existed if police had not heard or seen anything else).
" Panci v. United States, 256 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1958).
" Ong Way Jong v. United States, 245 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1957). In Ong Way
Jong, defendant was seen by agents with the narcotics seller, Wee, in defendant's car,
after the seller told the agents that he would contact his supplier. Later in the evening,
Wee told the agents he was waiting for his "connection" to return with the heroin. One
half-hour later the agents witnessed Ong meet with Wee, and after they separated, Wee
delivered the heroin to the agent's apartment. One week later Wee told agents that
his "connection" was playing Mah Jong, and agents had observed Ong depart from a
Mah Jong parlor that same day. The following day Wee told the agents he was with
his "connection," and agents had seen Wee and Ong together that day. Finally, during
a telephone conversation between Wee and the agents, the agents overheard a conver-
sation in the background with someone called "Johnny." Ong's alias was Johnny Ong.
These facts are similar to those in Stroupe, see text accompanying note 9 supra, and
the Ninth Circuit in Ong Way Jong held that no evidence was adduced to show that
Ong was engaged in a conspiracy, as these facts merely showed guilt by association.
Id. at 394. For a similar conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit, see United States v.
Oliva, 497 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in the narcotics transaction. 6 As no such evidence was adduced in
Stroupe, the Fourth Circuit found that Wright's out-of-court state-
ment was inadmissible hearsay, and reversed since the remaining
evidence failed to prove any involvement by Stroupe in a conspiracy
with Wright. Stroupe basically reaffirms existing federal law on the
quantum of evidence issue. 7
,1 Examples of such evidence are found in United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380
(5th Cir. 1976) (marked bills found in defendant's possession); Kay v. United States,
421 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1970) (actual delivery of cocaine by defendant to agent); United
States v. Manfredi, 275 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960), (agent's
witnessing of money passing from the seller to the defendant); United States v. Iacullo,
226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 966 (1956) (fingerprints of defendant
on the package containing narcotics).
11 The Fourth Circuit also confronted the issue of the question of independent
evidence necessary to implicate the defendant with a conspiracy in United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976). Eleven defendants were indicted for conspiring to
violate the narcotics laws under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970), and possession of heroin with
intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). The four appellants were
convicted, and on appeal argued that there was not enough independent evidence to
find the declarant associated with the conspiracy. Jones is distinguishable from
Stroupe because the issue in Jones was whether the declarant was sufficiently con-
nected with the conspiracy, whereas Stroupe was concerned with the connection of the
co-defendant toward whom the declarant's statements were directed. The contention
made by appellants in Jones was based on United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471,
476-77 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968), where the court held that in
order for a co-conspirator's hearsay statements to be admissible, there must be inde-
pendent evidence which links the declarant and the defendant in an illicit association.
Conversely, while the issue in Stroupe was whether a conspiracy existed between the
two co-defendants, the focus was on whether Stroupe was linked to the conspircy by
independent evidence, not whether the declarant was so linked. See text accompanying
note 9 supra. The Fourth Circuit in Jones once again applied the standard of whether
the declarant was connected to an illicit association by a "fair preponderance of the
evidence." 542 F.2d at 203. The factual situation surrounding the testimony in Jones
was complex, as eleven individuals were associated in the narcotics ring. In every claim
of inadmissible hearsay the court upheld the statements as admissible. The court
found each declarant to have been previously linked to the conspiracy by prior testi-
mony of known co-conspirators, and thus held that independent evidence did establish
that the declarant was a co-conspirator. Id. at 203-08. Since this independent evidence
revealed the declarants to be inolved in the joint undertaking, their subsequent decla-
rations were not inadmissible as hearsay.
Because of the complexity of Jones, the defense, when objecting to some of the
evidence admitted, did not make any specific reference to the record. Id. at 207.
Instead, the defense claimed that the objectionable "testimony consists of hundreds
of pages of transcripts." Id. Although the Fourth Circuit sorted out the relevant testi-
mony, it noted that when an appellant objects and no specific reference is made to the
record, "it is entirely proper for the Court to disregard such claim of error." Id. at 207
n.45. For further discussion of Jones, see Criminal Procedure, Section E, notes 32-49,
infra.
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"Any Evidence At All" Standard
In Freeman v. Slayton,"s the Fourth Circuit considered the suffi-
ciency of evidence required to uphold a conviction in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Freeman was convicted of unlawful possession of a
sawed-off shotgun."9 Later in the same evening after a grocery store
had been robbed, four men, including Freeman, were injured in an
automobile accident. Subsequently, stolen money and goods identi-
fied as goods taken from the store were found in Freeman's clothing
at the hospital, and in the automobile. In the trunk of the automobile
the police found an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, which yielded no
fingerprints. From this evidence the Fourth Circuit held that a jury
could reasonably connect Freeman to the robbery, and therefore also
to the car and the shotgun. 0
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Freeman, federal courts are not
concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.2 ' The Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon 22 held that the
only question involved in a habeas corpus review is whether there was
some evidence to support the order. The problem concerns the ques-
tion of what exactly is "some evidence." The Fourth Circuit has
frequently construed "some evidence" to mean "any evidence at
all."23 In contrast, the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits determine
whether the conviction is totally devoid of evidentiary support.
24
I No. 73-2247 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Feb.
22, 1977).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-268.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (Current version at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-301 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
2 Freeman v. Slayton, No. 73-2247, slip op. at 5-6.
21 E.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); Phillips v. Pitchess, 451 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972).
= 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1948). In Bridges, petitioner, subjected to a deportation order,
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. After the. order issued, the alien was detained,
and brought the proceeding to challenge that detention.
1 Freeman v. Slayton, No. 73-2247, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1976) (in habeas
corpus proceeding, sole constitutional question is whether the conviction rests on any
evidence at all); accord, Williams v. Peyton, 414 F.2d 776, 777 (4th Cir. 1969); Young
v. Boles, 343 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1965). But see Stevens v. Warden, 382 F.2d 429,
430 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968) (question was whether the trial
record was so devoid of evidence of guilt as to offend constitutional standards).
21 United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970);
Barquera v. California, 374 F.2d 177 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 876 (1967). The
"totally-devoid-of-evidentiary-support" standard evolved from Thompson v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), where the Court found the charges "so totally devoid
19771
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These differently phrased standards to not necessarily connote the
same meaning, and the question of what "some evidence" means has
been raised by the Ninth Circuit." That court mentioned that a mere
scintilla of evidence, rather than a total absence of evidence, might
also producd a due process question."
Such considerations were not discussed by the Fourth Circuit in
Freeman, and the court implemented the "any evidence at all" stan-
dard to uphold the conviction. Thus, the evidentiary standard used
by the Fourth Circuit in Freeman was different from that used in
Stroupe. This apparent disparity is due to the nature of the proceed-
ing. While only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to estab-
lish a defendant's conspiratorial involvement in order to introduce
hearsay statements," at a criminal trial, the prosecution must prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to comply with the Supreme Court's
decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur." In Mullaney, the defendant was
charged with murder. Maine courts had required the defendant to
prove by a fair preponderance of evidence that he acted in the heat
of passion to reduce the charges from murder to manslaughter.'
Thus, in other words, malice aforethought, a necessary element for a
murder conviction, was implied, and the defendant was required to
negate this element. 0 The Court found such a requirement to be
violative of due process, and held that the prosecution must prove the
absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.3 As Mullaney
involved a criminal trial, and the Court apparently only considered
the proper standard to employ at such a trial, Mullaney likely has no
of evidentiary support as to render defendant's conviction unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
Barquera v. California, 374 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 876
(1967). The Ninth Circuit stated that while the Supreme Court has reversed convic-
tions where it found no supportive evidence whatsoever, e.g., Thompson v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), "[t]he decisions do not necessarily mean that nothing
other than a complete absence of evidence would present a due process question." 374
F.2d at 180.
Barquera v. California, 374 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 876
(1967). The Supreme Court has held that to convict without evidence of guilt is a
violation of due process. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1961); Thompson
v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975); accord, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
(1949).
" Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686-88 (1975).
Id. at 687.
, Id. at 704. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (prosecution must
prove all elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
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effect on other legal proceedings." Freeman was not a criminal trial,
but rather a habeas corpus proceeding, which is civil in nature,s3 and
as such the criminal rules of procedure are not applicable.1 Arguably,
as a habeas corpus proceeding is not criminal, and is a collateral
review as opposed to a trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not
required.3 Instead, the judicial inquiry may be whether it was reason-
ably possible for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.36
The potential dangers of sfch a limited inquiry, however, are
evident in Freeman. The defendant was easily connected to the rob-
bery, and therefore to the automobile, but possession of the shotgun
did not necessarily follow from a mere connection to the automobile.
No fingerprints were found on the gun, the car which contained the
gun was neither owned nor rented by Freeman, none of the other guns
located in the car appears to have been connected to Freeman, and
three or four men had last been in the car. The only evidence which
linked Freeman to possession of the gun was the circumstantial evi-
dence that he was one of the passengers in the car. This did not
necessarily prove possession,3 and illustrates the limits to which the
See note 36 infra.
3 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 21, at 21 (1969).
u Id.
3 Cf. United States v. Stirone, 311 F.2d 277, 284-85 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 935 (1963) (on appeal from conviction, appellate court need not be convinced
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). See also 1 F. WHARTON, CRMINAL EVIDENCE § 11,
at 16 (13th ed. 1972).
2' See note 35 supra. The effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), upon the standards of proof required at the appel-
late level or at a habeas corpus proceeding is not completely discernible. While
Mullaney held that due process requires proof by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt, see text accompanying notes 28-31 supra, that case dealt with a criminal trial
and did not expressly indicate whether the rule would or should extend to other pro-
ceedings. Although Mullaney reached the Court on federal habeas corpus, the issue
was the standard of proof to be employed at trial, and not whether the evidence met
that standard. See 421 U.S. at 688-90. Therefore, Mullaney possibly leaves untouched
the "some evidence" of guilt standard employed by federal courts in habeas corpus
proceedings. See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra. For a discussion advocating the
desirability of extending the Mullaney holding to areas outside the criminal context,
see Comment, Unburdening The Criminal Defendant, Mullaney v. Wilbur And The
Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HRv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 390, 424-30 (1976).
:0 The Virginia statutes do not define possession, but make unlawful possession
of a sawed-off shotgun a felony when used for offensive or aggressive purposes. VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-301 (Repl. Vol. 1975). Criminal statutes usually define possession as
requiring conscious possession, necessitating a knowledge of the reception of the object,
or retention subsequent to awareness of control over the object. See W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 25, at 182 (1972). Furthermore, the Model Penal Code defines
possession as that condition occurring "[i]f the possessor knowingly procured or
1977]
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"any evidence at all" standard may be stretched. If possession were
not sufficiently proved, there might have been a due process viola-
tion, as "some evidence must be found on all essential elements of
the charge."3 In the Freeman dissent, Judge Winter perceived this
flaw and saw no evidence proving Freeman's control over the trunk
of the car, nor his knowledge or possible knowledge of what the trunk
contained.3 9 Lacking such proof, the dissent found no evidentiary
basis to support Freeman's possession conviction. 0
Freeman may indicate the Fourth Circuit's willingness to extend
the "any evidence at all" standard to its ultimate limits, and if so,
the court is unlikely to be lenient with future habeas corpus
petitioners. Whether the standard of proof on habeas corpus review
should be "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is left to future inter-
pretations and extensions of Mullaney. Likewise, the correctness of
the Fourth Circuit's standard, as opposed to a test determining if the
record is "totally devoid of evidence," or a test similar thereto, has
been left for determination in subsequent cases." The use of the "any
evidence at all" standard in Freeman demonstrated the standard's
breadth, and capacity to encompass, whether rightly or wrongly, al-
most every factual situation.
B. Witnesses.
Court-Called Witnesses
Judicial power, while not creating a duty to question witnesses,
implies a power to investigate as well as to decide.' The power to
investigate naturally includes a power to call witnesses.2 Accordingly,
received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period
to have been able to determinate his possession." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962). The Freeman facts do not mention that Freeman know-
ingly procured or received the shotgun, or that he was aware of any control he might
have had over it. See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
-1 United States ex rel. DeMoss v. Pennsylvania, 316 F.2d 841 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 859 (1963). This habeas corpus case was decided prior to Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and presumably the "some evidence" language con-
tained in its holding was not affected by the subsequent Mullaney decision. See note
36 supra.
3' No. 73-2247, slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1976) (Winter, J., dissenting).
I /d.
Apparently, only one other circuit has adopted the "any evidence at all" stan-
dard. Deljam v. Decker, 361 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1966).
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940).
2Id.
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trial judges may call witnesses not called by the parties.' Allowing a
trial judge to call a witness may help the jury in its fact-finding
process.4 The Fourth Circuit considered the propriety of a court-
called witness in United States v. Karnes.5
The trial court called and questioned two witnesses in Karnes
after the government informed the court that it would not call the
witness.' On appeal, the government conceded in oral argument that
it had no case against Karnes without the testimony of the court-
called witness.7 The Fourth Circuit, while acknowledging that the use
of court witnesses is within the court's discretion,' questioned
whether that discretion was properly exercised in Karnes. Generally,
in using discretion to call and question court witnesses, the trial judge
should be mindful of his powerful impact on the jury, must remain
dispassionate and fair,9 and may not become an advocate for either
party." The Fourth Circuit had previously recognized the privilege
and discretion of the trial judge to call witnesses," but the court
likewise subjected that privilege to "reasonable limitations."'
The Fourth Circuit divided in deciding Karnes. Two opinions
found an abuse of discretion, while Judge Russell, dissenting, found
no error in the trial court's actions. The majority opinion held that
the trial judge had abused his discretion, basing that decision on two
factors. First, the government admitted that it had no case without
3 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 82 (1942); United States v. Browne, 313
F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1963). This power has recently been codified in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. FED. R. Evm. 614 provides that "(a) [t]he court may, on its own motion
or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-
examine witnesses thus called. (b) The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called
by itself or by a party."
Cf. United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975) (the court's questioning
of a witness may help clarify and develop facts for the jury); United States v. Barbour,
420 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court's questioning of a witness may help clear up
ambiguous testimony).
531 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976).
The government did not want to call the witnesses in Karnes, as it could not
vouch for their candor. Id. at 216.
7Id.
" FED. R. Evin. 614. The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, were not in effect
at the time of Karnes' trial.
I E.g., United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975).
10 E.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975).
11 United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1044 (1970).
12 Id.
,3 531 F.2d at 219 (Russell, J., dissenting).
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the court's witnesses." That the witnesses were so crucial to the pros-
ecution indicated that the trial court destroyed the impartiality re-
quired by the due process clause. 5 Second, when court witnesses are
utilized, the court should afterwards comment to the jury that these
witnesses' testimony should be accorded no greater weight than any
other testimony." This, however, was not done at Karnes' trial.,7 For
these reasons the Fourth Circuit, finding an abuse of discretion by the
trial court, reversed Karnes' conviction and granted a new trial.
While the above factors were the basis for the court's holding of
abuse of discretion, Judge Widener, concurring, felt the decision
should not be based on the "already overworked" due process
clause. 8 Instead, when the trial judge destroys his impartiality at
trial, it is a procedural error, and not a violation of the due process
clause. 9 Apparently, Judge Widener preferred this rationale to re-
lieve the court from considering the constitutional questions in-
volved.2 Dissenting, Judge Russell stated that the importance of the
witness' testimony should not be determinative. 2 Instead, Judge
Russell felt the court has a duty to call witnesses whose testimony
" Id. at 216.
' Id. at 216-17. The due process clause provides that "[n]o person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The Fourth Circuit found no abuse in the questions asked the witnesses by the
court, but found only that the calling of witnesses so essential to the prosecution, whom
the prosecution declined to call, was an abuse of discretion. 531 F.2d at 216 n.3.
11 United States v. Vosper, 493 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1974) (judge, after question-
ing witness, must make appropriate comment to the jury in regard to weight given to
witness' testimony). This failure to comment appears to be per se reversible error in
cases where the court has questioned the witness, or has summarized and commented
on the evidence for the jury. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); Kyle
v. United States, 402 F.2d 443, 444-45 (5th Cir. 1968).
1' 531 F.2d at 217. Further authority, not mentioned by the Fourth Circuit in
Karnes, is found in United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Green
court held that the power to call witnesses should be sparingly used, and abstention is
wiser when the questioning of such witnesses is designed to obtain testimony favorable
to the prosecution. Id. at 760.
11 531 F.2d at 218 (Widener, J., concurring).
" Id.
Judge Widener cited Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), in support of his wish to base the reversal on a
federal criminal procedure error. 531 F.2d at 218 n.2. Ashwander enunciated the princi-
ple of avoiding constitutional questions if the record presented another ground upon
which the case could be decided. One problem with Judge Widener's opinion, however,
is the vague allusion to a criminal procedure error without any specific reference to
any particular rule violation. One supposition may be that this kind of error falls under
the plain error rule, FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
11 531 F.2d at 219.
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would help in the proper determination of the case, and therefore
went further than the majority in construing an affirmative duty of
the judge to call important witnesses, no matter which side the wit-
ness assists."2
Karnes illustrates the variety of viewpoints in the Fourth Circuit
on the propriety of court-called witnesses, and of the duty of the trial
judge in calling such witnesses. No definite standard can be gleaned
from Karnes, and it is evident that the makeup of the court may be
determinative in cases where the question involves an alleged abuse
in the calling of a witness.2 However, Karnes does indicate that the
Fourth Circuit disfavors court-called witnesses if those witnesses are
essential to a party's case.
Recantation of Testimony
The proper procedure for handling post-trial recantations of wit-
nesses was decided by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Wallace.24 The procedure employed in this situation is not yet uni-
form among the circuits.? The dispute centers around the effect the
witness' testimony may have had on the jurors. One test considers
whether the jury might have decided differently without the false
testimony, while the other test requires that the jury probably would
12 The dissent asserted:
when, as here, there are persons whose testimony, if believed by the
jury, could either lead to the defendant's conviction or could go far to
absolve the defendant, the trial judge has both a right and a duty, if
the Government refused to call the persons, to have them sworn as
court witnesses.
Id. This passage seems to imply that not only does the judge have a right to call
witnesses, he has an affirmative duty to call them in certain situations. This duty
derives from the trial judge's responsibility as both a guardian of defendant's rights,
and as a protector of society and the public. Id. at 219-20. If this implication is correct,
Judge Russell may envision the trial judge in a more active role than do the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which state only that trial judges may call witnesses. See note 3
supra.
" In cases where the abuse involves the court's questioning of a witness, the
Fourth Circuit has held that leading questions violate the judge's required impartiality
when coupled with frequent and disturbing interruptions of defense counsel's presenta-
tion. United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1044 (1970). The Fourth Circuit was unanimous in this holding, thereby giving a
clearer indication as to future Fourth Circuit responses to questioning of court witness
cases. No such indication is given by Karnes for cases involving the calling of an
essential witness.
24 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976).
2 See text accompanying notes 32-38 infra.
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have decided differently." In Wallace, the Fourth Circuit determined
that the test requiring only that the jury might have decided differ-
ently was the proper standard.
Wallace was convicted for possession of a sawed-off shotgun,2
found in the back seat of his car. At trial his brother testified that
Wallace had demonstrated knowledge that the gun was in the car.
This was the only testimony showing Wallace's knowledge of the
location of the shotgun. After completion of the trial, Wallace's
brother recanted, and stated in an affidavit that his original testi-
mony was false. The district court denied Wallace's motion for a new
trialz on the basis that the court's function was not to determine
which of the witness' stories may be true,2 and held that its function
was only to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct had contrib-
uted to or caused the testimony at trial." Since the district court
found no such misconduct, it denied the motion for a new trial.',
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court's
inquiry was incorrect, and joined the Fifth,32 Sixth,3 3 and Seventh
Circuits in applying what is known as the "Larrison test" to witness
recantations.3 4 Under that test, the court hearing the new trial motion
must make a three-pronged inquiry to decide if a new trial should be
granted. First, the court must be reasonably satisfied that the testi-
mony given by a material witness is false. The court must also ascer-
tain that without the testimony the jury might have reached a differ-
ent conclusion. Finally, the court must determine that the party
seeking the new trial was taken by surprise by the false testimony,
and did not know of its falsity until after trial.35 If these three criteria
exist, then a new trial should be awarded.
26 See text accompanying notes 35 and 37 infra.
2? Such possession was found to violate 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d) (1970) (unlawful for
one to possess a firearm not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration
and Transfer Record), 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (1970) (violation of the registration provision
carries fine of $10,000 or less, and 10-year imprisonment or less, or both), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1970) (one who commits, aids, or abets, or willfully causes an act to be done which
is an offense against the United States is punishable as a principle).




32 Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 862 n.4 (5th Cir. 1956).
11 Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
935 (1950).
1 Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928); accord, United
States v. Becker, 466 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
1 Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d at 87-88.
'3 Id.
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Conversely, the Second Circuit has employed a standard called
the "Berry test, '3 which required a new trial only when the recanta-
tion is so material that it would probably produce a different result
in a new trial. That court, however, applies the "Berry test" only if
there has been no prosecutorial misconduct."
Choosing between these two standards, the Fourth Circuit in
Wallace followed the Larrison test and applied it to a case involving
no prosecutorial misconduct.39 As the recanting witness gave proof at
trial of an essential element of the crime, he was a material witness."
The "majority rule" should then have been employed in considering
Wallace's motion for a new trial.4 ' Since the district court failed to
consider any of the three necessary inquiries, the Fourth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of
the Larrison standard.
2
Therefore, the Larrison test is apparently to be applied in the
Fourth Circuit to all motions for a new trial after a material witness
recants.43 The Fourth Circuit has repudiated the Second Circuit's
interpretation of Larrison, since the Larrison test was applied in
Wallace to a case not involving police or prosecutorial misconduct.
As a result, in the Fourth Circuit the court hearing the new trial
Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851).
= United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 286 n.14 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 999 (1971). If prosecutorial misconduct is shown, then the Second Circuit
applies the "Larrison test." Id. Accord, United States ex rel. Sostre v. Festa, 513 F.2d
1313, 1317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975) (Larrison test applied as there
was a possibility of prosecutorial misconduct because a police informer recanted);
United States ex rel. Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 880 (1974) (extended Larrison to police or prosecutorial misconduct, and
applied Larrison test when police coercion was involved in witness' testimony). The
reasoning of the Second Circuit in using prosecutorial misconduct as the distinguishing
factor is based on the fact that Larrison involved a form of prosecutorial misconduct.
In Larrison the false testimony was given at the instance of Post Office inspectors. 24
F.2d at 84-85 n.1. Because of this police/prosecutorial misconduct, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the already existing standard of Berry should not be used. Therefore the
Larrison test, which is easier to meet, should be used only in cases involving prosecu-
torial misconduct. United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 286 n.14. (2d Cir. 1970).
11 Wallace therefore holds that in the Fourth Circuit, in contrast to the Second
Circuit, see text accompanying note 38 supra, prosecutorial misconduct is not determi-
native of whether the Larrison test is applicable. See 528 F.2d at 866 n.3. Instead, the
Larrison test applies to all recantation cases.
" 528 F.2d at 866 n.3. Wallace's brother "was the only witness who testified that
defendant had knowledge that the gun was in the back of the car-proof of an essential
element of the crime." Id.
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motion must, among other considerations, determine if the jury
might have reached a different conclusion without the false testi-
mony.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
In Boone v. Paderick," the Fourth Circuit considered the effects
of a prosecutor's failure to disclose all material evidence. A detective
promised favorable treatment in future criminal proceedings to a
prosecution witness, Hargrove, if he would cooperate and testify
against Boone, his accomplice in a burglary. The detective promised
to use his influence on the Commonwealth's Attorney to forestall
prosecution of Hargrove. 5 Hargrove cooperated, and proved to be the
government's most important witness.46 The defense attorney was
never informed of the promise, and while suspecting the bargain at
trial, he was unable to elicit it on cross-examination. Hargrove denied
any promises of leniency, and in his closing argument the prosecutor
implied that Hargrove would be punished. Boone was subsequently
convicted,47 and he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus." During
the habeas proceedings, the prosecutor could not remember if he was
ever told of the detective's promise, although the detective testified
that the prosecutor had been told. The district court denied the writ, 9
and on appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding a denial of due
process.
The Boone decision was based on Giglio v. United States.5 0 In
Giglio, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor has a duty to
present all material evidence,"1 and if that duty is not fulfilled there
541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976).
" The Fourth Circuit found that the tentative nature of the promise increased its
significance. Id. at 451. The promise may be interpreted by the witness as contingent
on the quality of his testimony, thus making the witness more conscious of pleasing
the promisor with the testimony. Id.
" The Boone prosecutor told a newspaper reporter that without Hargrove's testi-
mony Boone would not have been convicted. Id. at 452 n.8.
" Id. at 448.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
1, 541 F.2d at 448.
50 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
11 Id. Material evidence is evidence offered to prove a proposition of a matter in
issue or probative of a matter in issue. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 (2d ed.
1972). For a discussion on the prosecutor's duty to disclose, and the problem of deter-
mining materiality, see Comment, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining
the Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IOWA L. REv. 433 (1973). See also Comment,
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty of Disclosure-Developing Standards Under Brady
v. Maryland, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 785 (1972). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
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is a violation of due process, irrespective of the prosecutor's good
faith.2 Likewise, this duty of the prosecutor entails correcting false
evidence, and disclosing evidence pertaining to credibility, if a cer-
tain witness' credibility is crucial to the determination of guilt." In
its determination, the Fourth Circuit had to decide if Giglio was
applicable, and if so, whether a new trial was required.
For Giglio to apply, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the
jury's determination was affected by false evidence, or by the non-
disclosure of evidence affecting credibility, and that such evidence
was material." In Boone, the Fourth Circuit found that Hargrove's
general denial of any prosecutorial agreements and the focus of the
prosecutor on Hargrove's altruistic motives established false evi-
dence.5 The jury thus received a false impression of Hargrove's credi-
bility, and its judgment was possibly affected. Giglio had been
found inapplicable in the district court as the promise was made,
without authority, by the police and not by the prosecutor.5 7 The
Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, holding that material undisclosed
evidence held by the police is attributable to the prosecutor, as the
police are considered part of the prosecution.58 The Boone court fur-
ther held that even if the detective were found to lack authority to
bind the government in an agreement, Giglio would still apply on
either one of two theories. First, although the prosecutor did not
remember being told of the promise to Hargrove, he did not deny it.5"
Since knowledge of a completely uncommunicated promise was im-
United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976), may have somewhat alleviated the
problem of determining materiality in prosecutorial non-disclosure cases. See text
accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
405 U.S. at 153-54.
Id. at 153-55.
I !d.
541 F.2d at 450.
Id. at 453.
In Giglio, the nondisclosure was between the trial prosecutor and an assistant
prosecutor. The Court imputed knowledge to the trial prosecutor because the prosecu-
tor's office is a single entity and spokesman for the government, and so a promise made
by one attorney from the office is attributable to the whole office. 405 U.S. at 154. The
district court in Boone did not find that the detective-prosecutor relationship created
the same situation, and would not attribute the detective's promise to the prosecutor.
541 F.2d at 450.
1 Id. at 450-51. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(tape held by Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, not by U.S. Attorney's Office,
did not render tape any less discoverable); Barber v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th
Cir. 1964) (makes no difference if the withholding of undisclosed material evidence is
by police officials instead of prosecutor).
51 See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
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puted to all members of the prosecutor's office in Giglio, such knowl-
edge is logically imputed when actual communication occurred be-
tween office personnel."0 Second, the Giglio Court had held that the
jury was entitled to know of any understandings regarding future
prosecution of a witness, as such information pertains to credibility.6
In Boone, the Fourth Circuit seems to have read that part of Giglio's
holding as an alternative basis for applying Giglio to cases where no
authority on the part of the promisor exists.
2
In determining whether a new trial was appropriate, the Fourth
Circuit had to consider the materiality of the evidence withheld. 3 To
determine materiality, the test recently announced by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Agurs64 must be met. Under the Agurs test,
if the omitted evidence would have created a reasonable doubt in
juror's minds, then due process has been violated. 5 Furthermore, the
omission is viewed in the context of the record as a whole, and if the
trial results in a questionable verdict, non-disclosed evidence of
seemingly minor importance might suffice to create a reasonable
doubt in a juror's mind.6 In Boone, three witnesses, of which Har-
grove was the most important,67 implicated Boone in the burglary. All
the physical evidence received at trial was linked to Boone by Har-
grove's testimony. No fingerprints were discovered, and the victim
could make no identification. For the defense, alibi witnesses testified
as to Boone's whereabouts during the robbery.6 The evidence as a
whole produced a close case, and the question was whether there was
a reasonable likelihood that a juror's judgment would be affected if
the undisclosed evidence were made known. 9 On these facts the
Fourth Circuit held that the non-disclosed evidence was material.
Since Hargrove was the only witness who observed the robbery, with-
out his testimony the evidence was entirely circumstantial, and a
reasonable likelihood existed that the jurors would have reached a
different verdict.70 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
"0 541 F.2d at 451. The Fourth Circuit had previously decided that the police are
considered part of the prosecutor's office. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
" Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
See 541 F.2d at 451.
13 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
£0 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
Id. at 2401-02.
££ Id. at 2402.
'7 See note 46 supra.
541 F.2d at 453.
0 See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
7o 541 F.2d at 453.
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court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus, and ordered issuance of
the writ subject to retrial.
Boone illustrates the variety of ways in which the Fourth Circuit
can apply Giglio. Where agreements concerning future prosecution
are made with government witnesses, it will be difficult for a prosecu-
tor to claim lack of knowledge or lack of authority after Boone .7 At
its broadest, Boone may be read as holding that a due process viola-
tion occurs whenever evidence pertaining to a government witness'
credibility is not disclosed, so long as any agreement or understand-
ing about future prosecutions of that witness has preceded his testi-
mony.
7 2
Impeachment of Own Witness
The Fourth Circuit considered another witness-credibility prob-
lem in United States v. Morlang,73 but instead of a situation where
counsel withheld evidence pertinent to a witness' credibility, in
Morlang the attorney attempted to impeach and discredit his own
witness. 4 The rule forbidding the impeaching of one's own witness is
well established. 75 Three notions traditionally supplied the bases for
this rule: that a party was bound by his witness' statements,7 that
the party guarantees his witness' general credibility, 77 and that the
party should not be able to coerce his witness.7 The Fourth Circuit
has stated its disregard for the rule, relying upon the then proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence as support.7 Although the Fourth Circuit
has previously acknowledged that in certain instances allowing coun-
71 See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
7 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975). For further discussion of Morlang see Criminal
Procedure, Section E, notes 1-31, infra.
7' 531 F.2d at 188.
7' See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896, at 659-60 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
7, Id. at § 897.
Id. at § 898.
7' Id. at § 899. The rule regarding impeachment of one's own witness, however,
has been discredited by scholars and case law. See United'States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d
347 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 958 (1963); Johnson v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 38, at 75 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 899, at 664-65 (Chadbourn rev.
1970).
" United States v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1060 (1972). The proposed Federal Rule of Evidence cited in
Lineberger, Rule 607, became effective with no change in language. The rule states that
"Ithe credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling him." FED. R. EvID. § 607.
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sel to impeach his own witness is desirable," the Morlang court sub-
stantially proscribed this practice by holding that such impeachment
is not allowable solely for the purpose of introducing inadmissible
hearsay evidence.
Morlang was convicted of conspiring to bribe a Federal Housing
Administration Director in order to gain FHA approval of a housing
development. Indicted with Morlang was Wilmoth, an insurance
agent authorized to make long-term loans. At trial, the government
called Wilmoth as its own witness, realizing that Wilmoth's testi-
mony would tend to exonerate Morlang.8 1 During Wilmoth's exami-
nation the government planned to obtain a denial that Wilmoth ever
had a conversation with Crist, a fellow inmate, in which Wilmoth
implicated Morlang. The prosecution then called Crist to impeach
Wilmoth. Afterwards, the prosecution admitted that it was not sur-
prised by Wilmoth's testimony.82 In calling Wilmoth, the govern-
ment's strategy was to impeach his testimony, and thereby get before
the jury an out-of-court statement which otherwise would have been
inadmissible as hearsay.83
While courts usually allow impeachment of one's own witness
where the witness surprises counsel with damaging testimony,84 this
was plainly not the situation in Morlang, where the prosecutor knew
before he called the witness that the witness would present testimony
adverse to his cause. The prosecution's sole purpose was to get other-
wise inadmissible hearsay statements to the jury through the im-
peachment process. 5 The courts of appeals uniformly reject this
W United States v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1060 (1972).
" 531 F.2d at 188.
92 Id.
" Because the trial occurred before the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect
in July, 1975, the Fourth Circuit relied on case law. However, the same kind of analysis
is arguably still applicable in Morlang, as the out-of-court statement there was not a
statement given previously under oath nor subject to cross-examination. 531 F.2d at
188. Hence, under Rule 801 (d)(1) such statement is still hearsay and usable only for
impeachment purposes. See Comment, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule
Against Impeaching of One's Own Witness: The Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TEx. L.
REv. 1383 (1974). Possibly, however, the statement might still come under another
exception to the hearsay rule, expecially under the catch-all provision of FED. R. Evm.
803(24). See also Martin v. United States, 528 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1975) (hearsay
evidence, consisting of prior inconsistent statements not made while under oath, may
be used for impeachment purposes only, not as substantive evidence).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 485 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1973); Troublefield v.
United States, 372 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
' See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
